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Summary findings
Samuel examines the role of the stock market as a signal  investment (firm-level data) confirms previous findings in
to managers in undertaking capital expenditures. He  the literature that the model's poor empirical
asks, what do managers base their investment decisions  performance was partly the result of using aggregate data
on? Do they go by their own perceptions  (managerial  for the whole economy.
perceptions) of fundamentals, or by market evaluations  These findings also have implication for the debate
(market perception)?  about the relationship between shareholder and
Is the stock market a sideshow, and should managers  managerial shortsightedness (myopia). In the literature,
ignore short-term changes in share prices if they do not  there is a notion that the stock market puts too much
reflect the firm's long-term prospects? Or must they  pressure on managers, who then underinvest for the long
respond to market valuations, believing that the stock  term, especially in research and development. But the
market's role is to value the firm as well as provide  results of Samuel's investigation suggest that because
finance?  market perception plays only a limited role in
Samuel concludes that both managerial and market  determining capital expenditures, shareholder myopia is
perception are important,  but that managerial perception  unlikely to result in managerial myopia.
is more important than market perception. The evidence  The implications for developing countries: While the
suggests that as a statistic, the Q ratio is not sufficient to  stock market may not be central to a firm's capital
explain firms' capital expenditure  decisions. So, despite  spending decisions, it is not a sideshow either. The stock
its theoretical elegance, the standard Q model of  market plays an important signaling role for managers.
investment should be modified. A more eclectic approach  This is a powerful rationale for financial reform and
would provide a more meaningful description of a firm's  capital development in developing countries.
capital spending decisions.  The results also suggest that complaints that stock
Overall, the results suggest that stock market activity  market activity leads to misallocation of resources may
has only limited implications for the economy's resource  be exaggerated.
allocation process. Evidence for the Q theory of
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In a market economy, the stock market performs three basic functions: (i) a source for
financing  investment; (ii) a signalling mechanism  to managers  regarding investment  decisions;
and (iii) a catalyst for corporate governance.
This  paper  focusses on the  role of  the stock market as  a  signal to  managers in
undertaking  capital  expenditures.' What do managers  base their investment  decisions  upon? Do
managers  go by own perceptions (managerial  perception)  of fundamentals  or market valuation
(market perception)?  In other words, what are the relative roles of managerial and market
perceptions in  capital expenditure decisions at the firm-level?  In this paper, an empirical
assessment  of these issues are undertaken  by looking at a panel of U.S. manufacturing  firms,
taken from Standard and Poor's Compustat  database.
The paper is divided into two main sections.  The first section lays out the analytical
framework for the study with a detailed discussion of the Q theory of investment and its
modifications. The second  section reports the results of the empirical  analysis  and discusses  the
implications  for developing  countries.
In the literature, there have been two contrasting  views regarding the role of the stock
market with respect to investment  decisions  in the economy.  One view argues that the stock
market is essentially  a sideshow. For instance,  Bosworth  (1975)  has shown  that if managers  are
concerned about the market value of the firm in the long-run while undertaking investment
' Samuel  (1995)  deals with  the financing  role of the market  and Samuel  (1996a)  deals  with the
governance  role of the market.decisions, they should ignore share price changes in the short-run if they do not reflect the firm's
longer-term prospects.
The opposite of this view is that stock market valuation matters  for investment.  For
instance, Fischer and Merton (1984) have shown that if the objective of managers is to maximize
the wealth of existing  shareholders,  they should respond to  market valuation even when this
deviates from the true value of the firm. This is because the role of the stock market is to value
the firm as well as provide finance. Fluctuations in share prices therefore  would alter  the cost
of capital to the firm. For instance, if investors are willing to accept lower returns than justified
by the true value of the firm--or stock prices are too high-- then firms  should issue new shares
and invest until the marginal product of capital equals that lower cost of capital. Such a strategy
would maximize the wealth of existing shareholders.
One element of this argument is the assumption that firms invest the proceeds of the new
share issue in physical assets. This need not be the optimal strategy since investing in physical
capital reduces its marginal product. As shown by Blanchard et al. (1993), firms could in fact
invest the funds  in  financial assets  like treasury  bills,  which  is equivalent  to  investing  in a
constant returns  to  scale technology. Therefore,  fluctuations in  share prices  may change the
composition of investment alone, without changing the level of investment.
In any case, as noted by Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1994), on a theoretical level, it is not
clear whether firms should respond only to fundamentals, or whether all share price movements,
including  those  caused by  irrational  changes  in investor  perception. of  future  states,  should
matter.  Therefore,  what firms actually do is an empirical question.
2Q theory
Within the class of alternative models of investment--accelerator,  neoclassical, modified
neoclassical, cash flow,  Q--it is the Q theory that posits a direct link between the stock market
and investment decisions in the economy. 2 At the level of the firm,  Q theory provides  a link
between the market's  valuation of the firm and investment decisions.  In general,  firms  should
undertake capital expenditures when the market value of an investment exceeds the replacement
cost of the investment.
What  is  interesting  about  the  Q theory  of  investment  is  that  it  attempts  to  explain
investment on a financial basis in terms of portfolio balance; all other theories are sort of output-
based.  Even  though the Q model  was formulated by Brainard  and Tobin  (1968) and Tobin
(1969), it can in  fact be traced back to Keynes (1936,  p.15 1): "The  daily revaluations of the
stock exchange, though they are primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investment between
one  individual  and  the  other,  inevitably  exert  a  decisive  influence  on  the  rate  of  current
investment. For there is no sense in building up a new enterprise at a cost greater  than that at
which a similar existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst there is an inducement to spend on
a new project what may seem an extravagant sum, if it can be floated off the stock exchange at
an immediate profit".
One attractive feature of the Q theory is that it characterizes the complete evolution of
the capital stock from  the underlying optimization problem;  this feature is also present  in the
irreversibility  models.3 In all the other models of investment, though the optimal level of capital
2 Chirinko (1993) provides a comprehensive  survey of the current state of research on investment
theory, with particular emphasis  on the Q-theoretic  models.
3  See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a more detailed  discussion  of irreversibility  models.
3stock is derived from the firm's maximization  problem, the optimal adjustment path for the
capital stock when it is away from that level is not explicitly considered. In these models,
dynamics  are introduced  to the equation  specification  by appeal  to delivery lags or other barriers
to instantaneous  capital adjustment that are not however  considered while deriving the optimal
capital stock itself.
The most common  approach to modelling  the Q theory rationalizes slow adjustment--
when the capital stock is away from its optimal level--by introducing  strictly convex costs of
adjustment when the level of capital stock is changed. Convexity  implies that adjustment costs
are rising at the margin and therefore large changes in capital stock are heavily penalized  and
the firm is induced to respond instead with a sequence  of smaller changes. Current level of
investment  is affected by both past developments,  and expectations  of future conditions. The
adjustment  costs themselves  can be thought of either as explicit installation/dismantling  costs,
or as losses of output resulting  from disruptions  to the productive  process when new capital is
introduced/existing  capital withdrawn.
There are three approaches  to implementing  this adjustment  cost framework:  (i) Q theory
(Summers  (1981)); (ii) Abel and Blanchard  (1986)  model, which avoids using stock market data
and does not assume either perfect competition or constant return to scale: and (iii) Euler
equation approach (Abel (1980)). In this paper, the focus is on the Q theory.
Following Summers (1981), an investment equation in terms of observables can be
written as
(I/K),=  c +(l/b)Q,  (1)
where I is investment, K is replacement  cost of capital, Q is the ratio of the stock market's
4valuation of the firm's capital to its replacement  cost and b is the adjustment cost parameter.
This valuation  ratio is known  as average  Q or Tobin's Q. 4 In this formulation  of the Q theory,
all expectations  relevant  to the current investment  decision  are summarized  in average  Q through
forward-looking  market valuation.
Several features of the Q investment  equation are worthy of note: (i) the parameters of
the Q investment  equation  are the structural  parameters  of the assumed  adjustment  cost function.
In other words, they are "deep" or "structural" parameters;  and (ii) the theory predicts that the
measured Q variable should be a sufficient statistic for the investment  rate.
Discussion
(i) An attractive  feature of the Q model is that since the market's expectations  regarding future
profitability  are completely  summarized  by the Q ratio, the lag distribution  excludes  delays due
to expectational  lags. Rather, lagged values of Q represent only order, delivery, and gestation
delays.
(ii) The major problem with the Q theory relates to the measurement of the unobservable
marginal Q. What is measured in practice is the average Q. There are situations where the
marginal and average Q could be quite different.
For example, suppose that an unexpected energy price increase made a considerable
portion of  the  firm's  existing plant and  equipment obsolete,  yet  simultaneously created
substantial  opportunities  for profitable new investment  in more energy-efficient  equipment. In
such a case, average Q might be less than unity, while marginal Q could exceed unity.
4  See  Hayashi  (1982)  for conditions  under  which  average  Q is equal  to marginal  Q, which  is the
measure  indicated  by theory.
5(iii) One common  finding of empirical research (based on eq. 1) on Q theory is that variations
in Q are unable to explain a large part of the variations in investment 5; the residuals also turn
out to be highly serially correlated, suggesting  that important explanatory  variables may have
been omitted. 6
For instance, output and profit variables still enter significantly when added to the Q
investment equations. Abel and Blanchard (1986) examined specifications where the two
components of marginal Q--marginal profit and the cost of capital--are specified as separate
regressors. They found that the marginal profit component  had a larger and more significant
effect on investment  than the cost of capital  component,  lending  further empirical support to the
earlier finding of Bischoff (1971) and Eisner (1978)  that investment  responds more to changes
in output  than to variations in the user cost of capital. Likewise,  Fazzari et al. (1988)  and others,
have found the cash flow term to be significant  in specifications  of the Q model. 7 This approach
is considered in greater detail below.
(iv) The empirical validity of the Q theory remains an unresolved  issue. A strict interpretation
of the Q model would predict a decline in investment following a dramatic decline in stock
prices. This however  did not happen  after the stock  market crash  of October 1987. For instance,
in Dun and Bradstreet's (1988)  survey  of 5000 firms, about 75  % of the companies  said that their
5 See  for instance  von  Furstenberg  (1977),  Summers  (1981),  and  Poterba  and  Summers  (1983).
6  Given  that the levels specification  leads to serially correlated  errors, the Q model  is usually
estimated  in first  differences.  See  Blanchard  et al. (1993)  for instance.
' Cash  flows  are defined  as the sum  of retained  earnings  and  depreciation.  In this  paper,  the terms
cash  flows  and internal  finance  are used interchangeably.
6capital spending  plans for 1988 would not be negatively affected by the stock market slump. 8
This indicates that the fundamentals  did not change with the crash of the stock market, even
though investor sentiments  did.  Likewise, Seyhun (1990)  has shown that insiders who bought
stocks aggressively  following  the 1987  crash benefitted  significantly  suggesting  that insiders  did
not perceive a shift in fundamentals  and viewed the market break as being driven by  investor
sentiments.
(v) As noted by Abel and Blanchard  (1986), one reason for the poor empirical performance  of
Q investment equations could be aggregation, since most of the early studies used aggregate
time-series  data.  One solution  to this problem of aggregation  is to use firm-level data, as done
in this paper and a host of others previously. The other advantage  of using firm-level data is
that several variables used in the construction of Q can be measured more accurately; in
particular, using share prices of individual  firms  provides  a direct measure  of market  value. The
use of panel data also helps in improving the precision of parameter estimates.
Another explanation  for the empirical shortcomings  of the standard Q model is to note
that if managers  react only to changes in fundamentals  and if the stock market is not efficient,
then the value of shares is a very imperfect  proxy for fundamentals.
Additionally,  the fact that firms make so little use of new equity issues and that there
appears to be so much noise in stock  prices seems to suggest that investment  may not be driven
solely by the Q ratio.
s It should however be noted that for the year, the S & P 500 changed  from its closing value of 246
on January 1, 1987  to  247 on December 31, 1987. Since managers  are likely to pay more attention  to
this long-term  change  in share  prices than  daily movements  in the context  of capital  expenditure  decisions,
the absence  of any significant  spillover  of the market  crash of October 1987  into capital  expenditures  may
not be surprising.
7(vi) Blundell  et al. (1992) have shown that while measured Q contains significant  information
for investment behavior, the implied adjustment process is unacceptably  slow and therefore
measured Q is not a sufficient statistic for investment  as predicted by the underlying theory.
Somewhat  disappointingly, this conclusion was found to be applicable  to panel data studies as
well as aggregate time series studies.
(vii) Finally, it should be emphasized  that neither stock  prices nor the Q-ratio could be said to
cause investment in any useful sense; it is more like stock prices and the Q ratio reacting to
information  relevant  to the firm. Anticipated  sales, profits or investments  affect both investment
and stock  prices. Therefore, changes  in stock  prices could predict  changes  in capital  expenditures
without there being  a causal  link from stock  prices to investment.  In other words, managers  may
not look at the Q ratio in deciding  their level of capital  expenditures.  However, the information
set on the basis of which managers make their investment decisions is correlated with the
information  that investors use in evaluating  securities,  and both of these are correlated with the
cash flows of the firm.
Modifications to the standard Q model
These considerations  suggest that the Q ratio is not a sufficient  statistic to describe the
behavior of capital expenditures at the firm-level. 9 One solution is to take an eclectic approach
and formulate  an investment  equation  that incorporates  elements from the alternative  theories  of
investment.  This is the approach taken in Fazzari et al. (1988) and other studies.  It should be
noted though that the primary focus of these studies is to highlight the role of internal finance
9 When the alternative  models  of investment  were compared  for the sample firms, it was found that
the adjusted  r 2 for the different  models  were remarkably  close, suggesting  that output, cost of capital and
cash flows were also important determinants  of capital expenditures  in addition to the Q ratio.  These
results are not shown here though.
8in capital expenditures  in the presence  of information  asymmetries  between insiders  and outside
suppliers of  capital.  Therefore, the  Q ratio is primarily used as  a proxy for  investment
opportunities  in these studies.' 1
Another solution is to argue that investment  is driven by market valuation as well as
fundamentals and use proxies for both.  While the Q ratio and share prices can be used as
proxies for market valuation, sales(level  as well as growth rate), cash flows, and dividends  can
be used as proxies for fundamentals. Blanchard  et al. (1990, 1993) and Rhee and Rhee (1991)
have taken this approach.  However, cash flows could also indicate  the presence  of managerial
discretion and information asymmetries.  While there is no explicit attempt to distinguish
between these various roles of cash flows in this part of the paper, these considerations  are
sufficient to regard cash flows as a fundamental  variable from the manager's perspective with
regard to capital expenditures.
Finally, it is also possible to  split the Q ratio into two parts reflecting market and
managerial  perception  elements  and use proxies for managerial  perception  (fundamentals).  This
approach  is based on Blanchard  et al. (1990). These modifications  to the standard Q model are
discussed  in detail below.
What is important to note about the last two approaches  is that they highlight  the role of
the stock market as a signal to managers  while undertaking  investment  decisions. Blanchard  et
al.  (1993), and Rhee and Rhee (1991) have argued that the issue here is whether managers
follow the signals given by the stock market  even if market valuation  does not match their own
perceptions  of fundamentals.
10 See  Samuel  (1995)  for a more  detailed  treatment  of this approach.
9Blanchard  et al. (1993)  argue that there could be at least three reasons for the manager's
valuation  of an investment  project to differ from that of the market: (i) the market may have less
information  than managers; (ii) even if information  sets are the same, the market may not value
assets at their fundamental  value, and market valuation could include a rational speculative
bubble; and (iii) the market may be subject  to fads which  cause market valuation  to deviate  from
fundamentals  for long periods of time.
In order to assess the relative roles of market perception and managerial perception
empirically,  two estimation  strategies  could be followed.  The first approach  is due to Blanchard
et al. (1990) wherein the Q-ratio is split into two components:  one showing market perception,
and the other managerial  perception.
Q =  V/K  =  (V/F).(F/K)  (2)
where Q is the ratio of market value (V) to the replacement cost of capital (K), and F is
fundamentals;  (V/F) shows market perception  and (F/K) shows managerial  perception. In the
literature, fundamentals  are proxied by sales, cash flows, and dividends.
As noted by Morck et al. (1990), sales could  be viewed  as a proxy for the future demand
for the firm's products and could signal the profitability of investment. The use of sales as a
fundamental  is also motivated  by the accelerator theory of investment  that emphasizes  the role
of demand factors and regards past levels of output as the most important  determinant  of future
output.  1 Cash flows are  a  proxy since they measure current  (and presumably future)
profitability and because it facilitates  investment  if the firm is constrained in capital markets.
"  Eisner (1978) argues that the rate of expected output should be the primary determinant of
investment. In practice,  this translates  to formulating  investment  as a distributed lag function  of current
and past changes  in sales.
10Profits also affect investment  by way of the fact that they are an important  variable in the bond-
rating of the firm and hence the amount of debt that can be contracted. Dividends  are related
to the permanent earnings of the firm, based on Lintner's (1956) theory of dividends.
As emphasized  by Mairesse  and Dormont  (1985)  and  others, investment  decisions  depend
upon expectations  since they  are forward looking. Only the sales and cash flow increases  which
the firm perceives as long-term or permanent will lead to net investment, while short-term or
transitory changes must be met by utilization of existing capital.  One way to build in this
consideration  is to substitute  current or past variables for anticipated  or future ones wherein it
is assumed that firms view their current and past changes  in sales and cash flows as permanent.
Therefore, the investment  equation can be specified  as
ln(I/K) =  aO + al(L)ln(F/K) +  a2(L)ln(V/F) + e  (3)
The logarithmic  specification  is also helpful  in that the coefficients  can be interpreted as
elasticities; it helps to reduce the skewness  of the size-distribution  as well.
There are several  hypotheses  that can be tested from this specification:  (i) the managerial
perception  hypothesis  that firms respond  only to fundamentals  as managers  perceive  them implies
that al(L)>0  and a2(L)=0;  (ii) if al(L)>a2(L),  managerial  perception matters more than
market perception  even though both are important; (iii) if al(L) =0  and a2(L)  >0,  only market
perception matters; (iv) if  al(L)<a2(L),  market perception matters more than managerial
perception  even  though  both are important;  and (v) if al(L) =a2(L), firms respond to movements
in Q, no matter what their sources is.
The second estimation strategy followed in this paper is  similar to the approach in
Blanchard et  al.  (1993) wherein investment is  a  function of both  managerial and market
11perceptions. This is essentially  similar to the specification  in eq. 3 except that explicit proxies
for managerial and market perceptions are used; in contrast, eq.  3 uses proxies only for
fundamentals.  One specification  could be
(I/K) = bO + bl(L) F + b2(L) V + e  (4)
where F is managerial perception, and V is market perception. The proxies for managerial
perception are cash flows, sales(level  as well as growth rate), and dividends; the proxies for
market perception are the Q-ratio, and real stock prices. The predictions  for bl(L) and b2(L)
are similar to the predictions for al(L) and a2(L) discussed  before.
The use of real stock  prices also addresses  the issue raised by Barro (1990)  regarding  the
role of stock prices in investment  decisions. Barro (1990) found changes  in stock prices to be
significant  in investment  regressions  for the U.S. and Canada at the aggregate  economy  level,
even in the presence of cash flow variables. Barro (1990) has argued that the stock market
outperforms  the standard  Q-ratio because  of possible measurement  problems  with market value
of debt and replacement  value of capital stock using aggregate  data.
Morck  et al.  (1990) also  used proxies for  managerial and  market perceptions to
investigate  the role of the stock market with regard to the firm's investment  decision using firm-
level data.  They concluded that since the stock market has small explanatory power for
investment beyond its  ability to  predict  fundamentals, complaints about  misallocation of
resources due to the stock market may be exaggerated. In other words, while the stock market
may not be a sideshow, it is not very central either.
Financing  and investment
It is also possible to infer the relative roles of managerial  and market perceptions in
12capital expenditure  decisions  at the firm-level  by looking at financing  patterns.  Specifically,  if
the market  perception  hypothesis  is correct and managers  respond to market  valuation  even  when
it exceeds their own assessment of  fundamentals or when equity is overpriced relative to
fundamentals, firms should issue new equity and finance investment out of this new equity.
However, as noted by Blanchard  et al. (1993), it is not necessary that the firm always use the
proceeds of the stock issue for capital  expenditures. The firm could also invest these proceeds
in financial  assets like Treasury bills.  What the firm does in practice therefore is an empirical
issue.
Therefore, firms can be expected to issue equity when equity is overpriced relative to
fundamentals  or when market valuation  is expected to be more important than fundamentals.
On the other hand, firms would finance internally, issue debt or buy back shares when equity
is underpriced  relative to fundamentals  or when fundamentals  are expected  to dominate  market
valuation.  In the literature, this is  also termed as the  "market timing" hypothesis.  The
undervaluation  and overvaluation  of equity can be assessed by looking at trends in a broad
market index like the S&P 500 or changes  in the price earnings ratio.
There is broad support for the market timing hypothesis  in the literature.  For instance,
using U.S.  data, Taggart (1977) showed that firms preferred to issue equity when the stock
prices were relatively high.  For  the UK, Marsh (1982) found that the timing of security
issuance was towards periods when the equity market in  general and the  firm's  stock in
particular were experiencing  large price gains and when interest rates were at relatively low
levels.  This may reflect the effect of lower market discount rates increasing  firm values at the
same time that more investment  projects became profitable.
13One way to  test the market timing hypothesis is  by looking at the composition of
investment finance at the firm level for different years.  In particular, analysis of 1987 should
be of interest. As noted earlier, 1987  was the year of the stock market  crash, when share prices
were believed to have  deviated significantly  from fundamentals. The findings  of Seyhun (1990)
noted earlier, reflect this. Insiders gained  substantially  by buying  shares  aggressively,  since they
knew correctly that the market break was due to a shift in investor sentiment  and not because
of changed fundamentals.  However, it should be noted that in a world of perfect capital
markets, this sort of market timing for financing investment is not an issue at all.  This is
because, with perfect capital markets, valuation  is always based on fundamentals.
Also, regression equations 3 and 4 can be estimated on a year-by-year basis and the
relative roles of market  valuation  and fundamentals  with regard to capital  expenditures  assessed.
This relative assessment  of market valuation  and fundamentals  can then be juxtaposed against
the observed patterns in equity issues on an yearly basis to make inferences regarding the
validity of the market timing hypothesis.
The market timing hypothesis  can also be tested by analyzing  firm-specific factors and
larger macroeconomic factors, by way of a  multivariate regression that models the firm's
decision to issue equity  as a function of firm-specific  factors like the Q ratio, financial slack' 2,
issue of long-term debt on a net basis, return on investment, and economy-wide  parameters  like
changes in the S&P 500 index and GDP growth.
The coefficient  on the Q ratio and the S&P 500 index is expected  to be positive, for the
12 Financial  slack  is defined  as  the difference  between  internal  finance  and  capital  expenditures  and
shows  how far the firm can avoid  external  finance  while  undertaking  capital  expenditures.  Building
financial  slack  essentially  allows  managers  to effectively  insulate  themselves  from  the constant  scrutiny
of capital  markets. See Samuel  (1995)  for a more  detailed  discussion.
14"market timing" hypothesis to be true.  In other words,  firms would like to issue equity when
it is overpriced relative to fundamentals and the general market conditions are bullish.  The GDP
growth coefficient is expected to be positive also,  given that the stock market and the economy
tend to move together and that the stock market is one of the leading indicators for the aggregate
economy.  The coefficient on the financial slack variable is expected to be negative, since higher
levels of financial slack imply that firms are likely to be more dependent on internal finance and
less  dependent on  external equity;  higher levels of  financial slack also  indicate that internal
finance is sufficient to meet the firm's  capital expenditure needs.  The coefficient on long-term
debt  is  expected  to  be  negative,  based  on  considerations  of  the  "financing  hierarchy"
hypothesis'3, wherein firms issue equity only after issuing debt and exhausting its debt capacity.
In a world of perfect  markets again, this is not an issue.  Finally,  the coefficient on return on
investment is expected to be positive, since firms that attain higher returns on their investments
are more likely to use external capital markets and issue equity.
According  to the financing  hierarchy/pecking  order hypothesis.  the firm's preferred ordering  of
the source of finance is: (i) internal  finance; (ii) external  debt; and (iii) new equity. See Samuel (1995)
for a detailed discussion.
15(1) Q model of investment  (table 1)
The empirical results are based on a panel of 603 manufacturing firms from the Standard
and Poor's  Compustat  database for  the 1972-1990 period.  The Q ratio  has been computed
following the methodology outlined in Salinger and Summers  (1983).
It is probably useful to begin the discussion of the results with a baseline model of the
Q theory.  Table  1 presents  the estimates in levels,  first difference,  and estimates using one-
period lag of Q as an instrument.'4 These estimates appear to be consistent with the previous
findings in the literature.  For instance,  most of the existing studies estimate the coefficient on
Q to be  between  0.003  and  0.010  and the estimate  here is  well within the range.'5 These
estimates also imply highly convex adjustment costs and very  slow adjustment." 6
The specification is also run in first differences,  following the practice in the literature
regarding concerns about serial correlation.  There has also been a suggestion in the literature
that the Q ratio may in fact be endogenous and correlated with the error term.  The instrumental
variable approach, using a one-period lag of Q as the instrument is meant to address this issue." 7
In general, the relationship  is specified  as
Yit =  io + fXitX 1t + cai  + vt + eit  where a; is the individual  firm effect and v, is the year
effect. The standard  approach  for sweeping  out fixed  effects,  by transforming  variables  to deviations  from
their firm-specific  means,  has been  used in this paper. These estimates  are also referred  to as the "within-
group" estimate in the literature. See Hsiao (1986)  for a more detailed  discussion  of this approach.
" Salinger and Summers  (1983) report estimates  of 0.004 to 0.006; Fazzari et al. (1988) of 0.004;
Hayashi and Inoue (1991)  of 0.004; Hoshi and Kashyap  (1987) of 0.009; and Blundell  et al. (1992)  of
0.005.
16  It  may be  recalled that the adjustment cost parameter is the reciprocal of the estimated Q
coefficient.
7 See Schaller (1990)  for instance.
16Market perception versus managerial perception with Q split into two components
(table 2)
The results  of the regression  based on eq.  3 are shown in table 2.  Three proxies  were
tried for fundamentals: cash flows, sales, and dividends. Of these, the cash flow proxy produces
the best fit. In all instances,  both the market and managerial perception terms were important,
even though  the managerial perception term turned out  to be more important than the market
perception  term.  Also,  in  all  but  one  instance,  the  market  perception  term  is  significantly
different  from  the  managerial  perception  term.  In  other  words,  while  both  market  and
managerial  perceptions  are  important,  the  latter  is  somewhat  more  important  in  capital
expenditure decisions at the firm level. It is also interesting to note that the one-period lagged
terms are significant in all cases.  In fact, all the regressions in this paper have been estimated
with one-period lags. Lags of higher order were tried, but turned out to be insignificant.  In the
case of the formulation that involves net sales, the negative coefficient suggests the presence of
monopolistic elements, consistent with findings of Schiantaralli and Georgoutso (1990).
The results of the equation involving cash flows as proxies for fundamentals suggest that
an increase of 1 per cent in market valuation not matched by an increase in fundamentals leads
to an increase in investment of 0.184 per cent, whereas an increase in market valuation matched
by an  increase in fundamentals leads to an increase in investment of 0.604  per cent.  Again,
these results are broadly consistent with the results in Blanchard et al.  (1993).
Market perception versus managerial perception with proxies for both (table 3)
The results  of the regression  based on eq.  4 are shown in table 3.  These regressions
were run with proxies  for both market and managerial perception.  The proxies for managerial
17perception (fundamentals) are cash flows, sales(level as well as growth rate), and dividends. The
proxies for market valuation are Q, and share price.
The  parameter  estimates  for  both  the  managerial  and  market  perception  terms  are
significant in all instances except where dividends and sales growth have been used as proxies
for fundamentals.  In most of these cases, the market perception term is significantly different
from the managerial perception term as well.  This suggests that dividends and sales growth are
not good proxies for managerial perception elements  and have other roles.  Of all the models,
the Q-sales model performs the best with Q as the proxy for market perception and sales as the
proxy for  managerial perception.  As noted before,  the negative sales coefficient  is consistent
with  the  presence  of  imperfect  competition,  which  introduces  an  additional  wedge  between
marginal and average Q that depends on the present value of current and future output.  Further,
the managerial perception term is higher than the market perception term in almost all of these
regressions.  This implies  that managers pay  much more attention to their own perception  of
fundamentals than those  conveyed by the  market.  Overall,  the evidence suggests that both
market valuation and fundamentals have strong effects on investment, even though the elasticity
of investment with regard to fundamentals is larger.  Based on the best-fitting stock price-sales
model, the results  suggest that an increase of I per cent in market valuation not matched by an
increase  in fundamentals leads to an  increase  in  investment of  0.0011  per  cent,  whereas an
increase  in market valuation  matched by an  increase in  fundamentals leads to an  increase  in
investment  of  0.018  per  cent.  These  results  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  evidence  in
Blanchard  et al.  (1993) based  on aggregate U.S.  data for the  1922-1990 period,  though  the
elasticity estimates are somewhat lower.
18(II) Analysis of variance
It  is interesting  to complement  the regression  analysis with an analysis of variance in
order  to  isolate the effects of fundamentals and  valuation in  capital expenditures  at the firm
level.  In what follows,  this analysis of variance has been done for the sample split in three
ways: pooled, cross-section,  and time-series.
Proxies for fundamentals  after splitting  the Q ratio (table 4)
Table 4 presents  the results of the analysis of sources of variation after  splitting the Q
ratio into two components and using proxies for fundamentals.  In all instance, cash flow proved
to be the best proxy for fundamentals.  The estimates from pooled regressions  with fixed firm
and year effects suggest that fundamentals accounted for  11-14 percent of the total variation in
investment (I/K).  In contrast,  market valuation explained only  1-4 percent  of the investment
variation.  The estimates from cross-section regressions suggest that fundamentals accounted for
30 percent  of  the variation in investment.  In contrast,  market valuation explained only  0-1
percent  of the investment variation.  The estimates from time-series  regressions  suggest that
fundamentals explained between 55-68 percent of the total variation in investment.  On the other
hand,  market valuation explained only 6-20 percent of the investment variation.
These results suggest that while both fundamentals and market valuation are important
for explaining variations in capital expenditures at the firm level, fundamentals are much more
important than market valuation.
Proxies for managerial  and market perceptions  (table 5)
Table 5 presents  the results of the analysis of sources of variation after using separate
proxies for fundamentals and market valuation.  While the cash flow-share price model turned
19out to be the best in cross section and time series regressions, the cash flow-Q model was the
best in pooled regressions.
The estimates from pooled regressions with fixed firm and year effects suggest that
fundamentals  accounted  for 7-8 percent of the total variation in investment  (I/K).  In contrast,
market valuation  explained only 0-2 percent of the investment  variation.  The estimates from
cross-section  regressions  suggest that fundamentals  accounted  for 29-31 percent of the variation
in investment.  In contrast, market valuation explained only 3-5 percent of the investment
variation. The estimates  from time-series  regressions  suggest  that  fundamentals  explained  56-65
percent of the total variation in investment. On the other hand, market  valuation  explained  only
3-11 percent of the investment  variation.
These results again suggest that while both fundamentals  and market valuation are
important for explaining  variations in investment, fundamentals  are much more important  than
market valuation.  In other words, these results from the analysis of variance reinforce the
earlier regression results in that though both market valuation and fundamentals  are important
in capital expenditures  at the firm level, fundamentals  play a much greater role than market
valuation.
(III) Aggregate  time-series  estimates
As noted by  Schaller (1990), one way to  test the extent to  which aggregation is
responsible for the poor empirical performance of the standard Q model is to construct a
synthetic aggregate time series from the firm-level data.  This provides an intermediate case
between a true aggregate time-series and firm-level panel data.  Such a synthetic aggregate
allows better exploitation  of the firm-level data such as the value of the equity.  On the other
20'1  r 
hand, it involves the same sort of aggregation problems as a true aggregate time-series since the
individual components are calculated at the firm level and summed and the aggregate values are
calculated as ratios  of these sums.  The results presented  in  Schaller  (1990) do suggest that
aggregation bias is statistically significant.
The aggregate analysis is also useful in testing the consistency of these relationships noted
at the firm level.  In addition,  this is useful in checking the consistency of these results against
the results of Blanchardiet al.  (1993) for the aggregate U.S.  economy.
Proxies for fundamentals after  splitting the Q ratio (table 6)
Three proxies were tried for fundamentals: cash flows, sales, and dividends.  At all levels
of lags--from  two to zero--the  sales proxy proved  to be  the best.  What is interesting to note
about these results  is that lagged terms turn out to be insignificant in these regressions.  Again,
capital expenditure decisions seem to be much more dependent on managers'  own perceptions
of fundamentals than market perception.
Proxies for managerial and market perceptions (table 7)
Based on adjusted r2, the stock prices-sales  model does best at the aggregate level in a
formulation  with no lag terms;  it may be recalled that in  firm-level regressions,  the Q-sales
model was number one and the share price-sales  model number two.  However,  stock prices
have  the wrong,  negative sign.  As  seen  elsewhere,  managerial  perception  of fundamentals
matters  more than market perception factors, even though both sets of factors are important.
At one level, these results are similar to the results in Barro (1990) in that stock prices do better
than the Q ratio as a proxy  for market valuation in aggregate investment equations.
Next, regressions were run with lags in them; the first consideration was in working with
21lags of different  lengths.  What is interesting to note here is that even though two lags were
tried, none of the lagged terms turn out to be important in the time-series regressions.  This is
unlike the finding from the firm-level regressions where lagged values of managerial and market
perception  factors  were  often  found  to  be  significant.  As  noted  before,  the  managerial
perception factors seem to be more important than market perception factors in the firm's  capital
expenditure decisions.
These results in tables 6 and 7 suggest the presence of autocorrelation and the correction
appears  to be adequate.  This  is consistent with  the finding in  the literature  where the level
specifications are often plagued with serial correlation errors and therefore,  the regressions come
to be estimated in first differences of logarithms." 8
These  results  from  aggregate  regressions  suggest  that  there  is  no  one-to-one
correspondence between findings from the firm-level regressions and aggregate regressions.  In
other words,  the results from firm-level and aggregate regressions are inconsistent.  However,
to the extent that the estimates from firm-level regressions are more likely to be precise  since
the relevant variables  can be measured  more accurately,  one could place greater  trust  in the
firm-level results  shown in tables 2,  3 rather than the aggregate results  shown in tables 6, 7.
Also, the fact that the market perception term has the wrong, negative sign in tables 6, 7 suggest
that the aggregation procedure might have led to significant measurement problems.  Finally,
aggregation  bias  could  also  result  from  incorrectly  assuming  that  all  firms  face  the  same
adjustment cost functions.19
's  See Blanchard et al. (1993)  for instance.
'9  This is also a problem in firm-level regressions  to the extent that all firms are estimated  with a
single coefficient  on the Q ratio.
22(IV) Financing  and investment
Market perception Vs Managerial  perception:  Q split (table 8)
Of  the  eighteen  years  in  the  study,  cash  flow  turned  out  to  be  the  best  proxy  for
fundamentals in all the years except  1974.  For  1974, net sales turns out to be the best proxy
for  fundamentals.  Interestingly,  in all instances where  cash flows  were used as proxies  for
fundamentals,  managerial perception turned out to be more important than market perception;
this pattern is reversed in the one case where sales was used as the proxy with market perception
proving  to be  more important than managerial perception.  Also, in all of these 18 years,  the
market perception term was significantly different from the managerial perception term; in some
instances, it was true for both current and the lagged terms.
What about 1987, the year of the stock market crash? Cash flow turns out to be the best
proxy  for  fundamentals  for  1987,  and  the  managerial  perception  term  higher  than  market
perception term.  This  result accords well with the notion that the stock market correction of
1987 had only limited impact on capital expenditure decisions at the firm-level and the overall
resource allocation process in the economy.  Managers did not seem to have perceived a shift
in the fundamentals facing  firms  in the wake of  the market  crash,  even though  there  was a
significant shift in the investor sentiment governing the market.
Market perception  Vs Managerial  perception:  Proxies for both (table 9)
The conclusions from using separate proxies for market and managerial perceptions are
very  similar  to  the  conclusions  from  splitting  the  Q ratio  and  using  different  proxies  for
fundamentals that were described in the previous  section.  Of the eighteen years  under study,
the Q-cash flow model performed best in nine years, while the share price-cash flow model was
23best in the other nine years. This is consistent  with the previous results in this chapter of Q and
stock  prices being the best proxies for market perception  and cash flows and sales as proxies for
managerial  perception.  In all instances, capital  expenditure  decisions  at the firm-level seem to
be more guided  by the managers' own perceptions of fundamentals  than market perceptions.
With regard to 1987, the findings  reported before continue  to hold wherein managerial
perception factors played a much greater role than market perception factors.  In other words,
managers  did not seem to have perceived  a shift in fundamentals  facing firms in the wake  of the
market crash, even though there was a significant  shift in the investor sentiment  governing the
market.  These results also suggest that while cash flow is the best proxy for managerial
perception, Q and stock prices are equally good proxies for market perception.  This  is
consistent with the evidence from the previous sections.
Trends in sources of funds
Also,  evidence elsewhere suggest that  1987 was the  year with the  second highest
contribution  from net issue of equity to total sources of funds; the highest contribution  was in
1978.20 It is remarkable that the stock market contribution to total sources of funds for the
sample firms was positive in 1987, the year of the stock market crash.  Though this result looks
sort of implausible at  first, it should be remembered that the market collapsed only in the month
of October, and that there was a tremendous  run-up in share prices until that time.  As noted
by Blanchard  et al. (1993), the price-earnings  ratio on the S&P 500 index increased from 11.0
at the end of 1984 to 20.3 in the third quarter of 1987, before falling to 14.0 at the end of 1987.
2"  For the 1972-1987  period, the contribution  of net issue of equity to total sources of funds was
positive in eight years and negative  in the remaining  eight years.  See Samuel (1995) for more details.
24This  evidence together  with  the results  in  tables  8,  9  suggest  that  the equity  issue
decisions of firms were independent of the relative roles of market valuation and fundamentals.
Therefore,  there is no evidence here to  support the hypothesis  advanced by Blanchard  et al.
(1993) that if managers respond  to market valuation even when it exceeds their perception of
fundamentals, they would do so by issuing new shares, as a way of effecting the transfer  from
new to  existing  shareholders.  In  fact,  in  1974, the only  year in  which  market  perception
exceeded managerial  perception  (table  8),  the net  issue of  shares  for  the sample  firms  was
negative. 2"  This  evidence also reinforces  the earlier finding that by and large,  managers pay
more  attention  to  managerial  perceptions  than  market  perceptions  with  regard  to  capital
expenditures  at the firm level.
Regression analysis (table 10)
The results of the regression that explored the market timing hypothesis in terms of firm-
specific as well as macroeconomic factors are shown in table 10.  In general,  all the variables
are significant with the correct  signs, except GDP growth and changes in the S&P 500 index
which turn out to be insignificant.  The insignificant coefficient on the S&P 500 index possibly
reflects the fact that the sample omits major mergers.  It is well known that mergers follow a
wave-like  pattern  and  closely  follow  movements  in  the  stock  market. 22 To  the  extent  that
mergers  are  financed  through  equity  issues  and  to the  extent  that  mergers  are procyclical,
movements in an aggregate  stock index like S&P 500 are likely to  have a positive effect on
equity issues by the firm.  The lack of such a positive relationship between changes in the S&P
21 See  Samuel  (1995)  for more  details.
22  See  Mueller  (1987)  for instance.
25500 index and equity  issues,  as found here,  possibly  reflects  this.  The positive,  significant
coefficient for the Q ratio provides broad support for the "market timing" hypothesis and implies
that managers do pay attention to the movements in the Q ratio while undertaking equity issues.
It is also consistent with the Myers and Majluff (1984) prediction that firms tend to issue equity
when the level of asymmetric information is low.  During bull markets, public information may
dominate private  information of managers, and make an equity issue attractive.  The positive
coefficient  for  the  return  on  assets  term  suggests  that  firms  that  attain  higher  returns  on
investment are more likely to be dependent on external finance and issue equity. 23
Conclusions and Discussion
The evidence in this paper suggests that while Q and real stock prices are the best proxies
for market perception, cash flow and sales are the best proxies for managerial perception. Both
managerial and market perception elements are important for capital expenditure decisions at the
firm-level;  however,  managerial perception  matters more than market perception.  Therefore,
these results  at the firm-level reinforce  the findings of Blanchard et al. (1993) regarding  the
importance  of managerial  perception  elements at the aggregate  economy level  for the U.S..
From  the perspective of managers undertaking capital expenditure decisions at the firm-level,
these results imply that while stock market signals and activity are important,  they are only of
secondary  importance.  What  is of  primary  importance  is  the  manager's  own perception  of
fundamentals facing firm. Therefore,  these results are also consistent with the finding of Morck
et  al.  (1990)  regarding  the  limited  implications  of  stock  market  activity  for  the  resource
13  Though return on sales and return on equity were tried as alternative  measures of return on
investment,  return on assets provided  the best fit.
26allocation process in the economy.  Also, the overall evidence for the Q theory of investment
based on firm-level data confirms the previous finding in the literature  that the poor empirical
performance of the Q model in the past has been due in part to the use of aggregate data at the
economy level.
These results  also suggest that the Q ratio is not a sufficient statistic to explain capital
expenditure  decisions at the firm-level and  that managerial  as well as  market perception  are
important.  Further,  managerial perception matters more than market perception.  Therefore,
the evidence in this paper underscores the need to modify the standard Q model of investment,
despite its theoretical elegance,  and adopt a more eclectic approach in order  for it to serve as
a more meaningful description  of capital expenditure decisions at the firm-level.
In addition,  these findings have important implications  for the debate  in the literature
regarding  the relationship  between shareholder  myopia and managerial  myopia. 24 There  is a
notion in the literature  that the stock market puts too much pressure on managers, who in turn
indulge in myopic behavior by underinvesting for the long-term,  especially by way of R and D
expenditures.  The  results  presented  here  suggest  that,  given  the limited  role  that  market
perception  elements  play  in  the  determination  of  capital  expenditures  at  the  firm-level,
shareholder myopia is unlikely to lead to managerial myopia.
From  the perspective of developing countries,  these results imply that while the stock
market may not be central to the firm's  capital expenditure decisions, it is not a sideshow either.
I Shareholder  myopia means  the tendency  of shareholders  to focus  on the behavior  of stock prices
in the short term as opposed  to the long term. Likewise,  managerial  myopia  implies  managerial  behavior
focussed on improving  earnings in the short term at the expense  of long term growth; for instance, by
way of skimping  on R and D and maintenance  expenditures  that would eventually  prove to be perilous
to the firm's long term prospects. See Samuel (1996b)  for a more detailed  discussion.
27The stock market plays a useful and important role as a signalling device for managers.  This
finding in  turn provides  a powerful  rationale for  financial sector reforms  and capital market
development in developing countries.
However,  in practice,  the application of the Q model to developing countries has been
limited, given the rather exacting data requirements for the computation of the Q ratio, following
the  methodology  outlined  in  Salinger  and  Summers  (1983).  In particular,  it is  difficult to
estimate the replacement cost of the firm's  capital stock precisely and one has to use the book
value  instead.  Given  these  data  limitations,  testing  of  investment  theories  in  developing
countries have been confined to accelerator, neoclassical, and cash flow theories of investment. 25
Once  firm-level  data becomes  available  for developing  countries,  it would  be  interesting  to
replicate the analysis done in this paper to test the robustness of these results.
The findings in the paper with regard to the market timing hypothesis are also interesting.
The results suggest that managers do pay attention to the movements in the Q ratio while issuing
equity.  In particular,  firms  tend to issue equity when the level of asymmetric  information is
low, as for instance during bull markets.  There is some evidence from India that supports this
market timing hypothesis.  Reserve Bank of India's  (RBI (1995)) survey of public response to
capital issues for the 1986-87 to 1990-91 period suggest that there was an increasing tempo in
the activities  of the capital market during this period,  when there was an overall boom in the
Indian stock market. 26
25 Athey and Laumas (1994) found support for the cash flow theory of investment  for India.
Likewise, Nabi (1989) and Tybout (1983) found support for the cash flow theory for Pakistan and
Colombia respectively. Also, Bilsborrow  (1977) found support for accelerator  and cash flow theories
using panel data for manufacturing  firms in Colombia.
'  See RBI (1995) for more details.
28The evidence presented in this paper also offers an interesting perspective  on the more
general issue of stock market activity and its implications for the resource allocation process in
the economy.  To paraphrase, the results here suggest that the stock market is neither a sideshow
nor is it central.  In other words,  complaints about misallocation of resources  in the economy
due to stock market activity may be exaggerated.
This  finding is  especially relevant for developing  countries.  There  is a view  in the
literature that stock market activity encourages speculation, excessive volatility of slhare  prices,
short-termism  etc.  and  channels resources  into socially unproductive  activities. 27 Therefore,
stock market  development  may not be  a beneficial endeavor  for developing  countries.  The
results in this paper offer a powerful counter argument.  Given that managerial perceptions are
more important than market perceptions  for capital expenditure decisions at the firm-level and
given that the stock market plays a rather limited role as a source of finance 28, it is unlikely that
stock  market activity  has  deleterious  implications  for  the resource  a 'ocation  process  in  the
economy.
This conclusion of course raises another question: what are the other implications of stock
market activity for firms,  over and above its financing and signalling functions.  The answer is
that there are many other roles  that the stock market plays in a market economy:  (i) it acts as
the market for corporate  control;  (ii) it functions as a catalyst for corporate  governance; 29 (iii)
27 See  Singh  (1993)  for instance.
2  Samuel (1996c) undertakes  a comparison of Indian and U.S. firms and shows that the stock
market plays a limited role as a source of finance in both countries.
29  See Samuel (1996a) for a detailed discussion  of the role of the stock market as a catalyst for
corporate governance.
29it provides liquidity to individuals, helps them achieve their preferred time-path of consumption,
and aids in their portfolio diversification; (iv) it serves as a means for transferring  risks among
various economic agents; (v) managers may  worry about stock market activity because of the
link between managerial compensation and stock prices, especially by way of stock options and
warrants; (vi) managers would care about share prices if it is that their hiring and firing is linked
to  the performance  of  the  stock price;  (vii)  stock  market  developments  influence  the  debt
capacity of the firm; (viii) managers care about stock market activity because of implications of
shareholder  trading  horizons  for  managerial  horizons,  especially  with  regard  to  long-term
investments  like intangible investments.
These considerations are relevant for developing countries as well, especially those that
are  actively  reforming  their  financial  sectors  and  nurturing  capital  markets.  They  are also
important in view of the current world-wide interest  in emerging  markets and the proliferation
of global investors.  Of course, much needs to be done by way of market microstructure  reforms
in developing countries,  related to bolstering the institutional framework  for capital markets,
especially  with  regard  to  payment  and  settlement  systems and  national treatment  of foreign
investors  in general and institutional investors in particular.
These considerations  are also  relevant to  the debate in  the literature  on the costs and
benefits of stock market-dominated economic systems versus bank-dominated economic systems
and their implications for corporate governance and overall efficiency of the resource allocation
process. 30 For instance, Allen (1993) has suggested that in some circumstances,  banks will be
the optimal way of allocating resources while stock markets are better in others.  Banks will be
3 See for instance, Porter (1992), Allen (1993), Stiglitz (1992).
30a  good  way  to  provide  financing  in  traditional  industries  such  as  agriculture  where  the
technology is  well known and there  is a wide consensus on how things  should be done.  In
industries  where  there is little consensus on how the firms  should be managed,  allocation  of
resources  through the stock market is desirable.  This is because the stock market provides  a
way of checking  that firms are well run when there are divergences of opinion on how firms
should be run.  The theory is consistent with the observation that the stock market was important
in  the UK  during  the  nineteenth  century  when  it  was  the first  country  to  go  through  the
Industrial revolution.  It is also consistent with the fact that the U.S.  has relied heavily on stock
markets in the twentieth century when it was the first country to go through the post-Industrial
revolution.
From the perspective of developing countries, these considerations imply that for building
basic industries where the technology is well known, banks are likely to be more appropriate.
On the other hand, active stock markets are necessary to develop new industries where there is
no consensus on technology.  In other words, the choice of developing countries vis-a-vis banks
and stock markets depends to a large extent on their stage of development.  While developing
countries  need banks as  well as  stock markets,  it may be  more prudent  for them to develop
bank-based financial systems at the beginning of the industrialization process.  This conclusion
is  especially  relevant  for  transitional  economies  that  are  in  the  process  of  building  basic
industries."
In conclusion,  the evidence in this paper  suggests that  managerial perception  is more
31 See Long and Rutkowska (1995) for a detailed discussion of the role of banks in enterprise
restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe.
31important than market perception with regard to capital expenditure decisions at the firm-level.
This  combined with the fact that the stock market serves a limited role as a source of finance
suggest that complaints about the misallocation of resources  due to stock market activity may
be exaggerated.  While the U.S.  experience may not be strictly valid in other country settings,
the evidence presented in this paper does offer a rationale for financial sector reforms and capital
market development initiatives undertaken in developing countries.
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36Table 1: Q model of investment
In (q)  In (q-1)  Adjusted r 2
Estimates in levels  0.151(7.34)  0.300(14.95)  0.113
__n  (q)  Aln  (q-1)  Adjusted r 2
Estimates in
difference  0.104(4.44)  0.301(13.03)  0.040
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  q  Adjusted r2
Estimates with
instruments  0.406(43.49)  0.160
Notes: One-period lag of Q used as an instrument.
The regressions  include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics  are shown in parentheses.
37Table 2: Market perception and managerial perception
_  _  _  _  _  _,I  H  III
Market perception(t)  0.103  0.179*  0.144*
(4.77)  (8.43)  (6.83)
Market perception  0.081*  0.152*  0.224*
(t-1)  (3.98)  (7.73  (11.24)
Managerial  0.127  -0.084  0.121
perception(t)  (5.48)  (-2.34)  (5.37)
Managerial  0.477  0.716  0.274
perception(t-1)  (21.72)  (21.20)  (13.28)
NT  8422  8422  8422
Adjusted  r 2 0.146  0.125  0.095
Note: (I) cash flow, (II) net sales, and (III) dividends  were used as proxies for fundamentals.
*  indicates that the market perception term is significantly different from the managerial
perception term for the same time period.
The regressions  include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
These regressions are based on eq. 3.
38Table 3: Market perception and managerial perception
I  n  Hi  IV  v  VI  VII
Market  0.004*  0.002*  0.001  0.004  -0.002*  -0.004  0.001*
perception(t)  (9.77)  (4.90)  (3.42)  (2.87)  (-1.29)  (-3.17)  (3.49)
Market  -0.002*  -0.0002  0.0003  -0.003*  0.001*  0.003  0.0003
perception(t- 1)  (-9.07)  (  (1.55)  (-4.45)  (2.73)  (5.32)  (1.54)
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~(-0  .95)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Managerial  -0.018  -0.027  0.003  -0.005  -0.027  0.007  -
perception(t)  (-2.85)  (  (0.29)  (-0.7)  (  (0.67)  0.00001
17.18)  16.81)  (-0.11)
Managerial  0.154  0.046  0.010  0.138  0.045  0.013  0.00000
perception(t-1)  (22.07)  (28.38)  (0.92)  (20.10)  (28.11)  (1.23)  1
______  _______  ~(0.12)
NT  10852  10852  10852  10852  10852  10852  10852
Adjusted r2 0.078  0.091  0.021  0.072  0.088  0.020  0.021
Note: (I) Q-cash flow, (II) Q-sales,  (III) Q-dividends,  (IV) stock prices-cash  flows, (V) stock
prices-sales,  (VI) stock prices-dividends,,  and (VII) Q-sales growth.
*  indicates  that  the  market  perception  term  is  significantly  different  from  the  managerial
perception term for the same time period.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
These regressions  are based on eq.  4.
39Table 4: Analysis  of sources of variation  in investment
Source of variation  Share of total sum of squares
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fundamentals  and market
valuation (RA)  0.148  0.307  0.742
Error  (1-RA)  0.852  0.693  0.258
Fundamentals  rust
Fundamentals (RB)  0.137  0.304  0.547
Market valuation (RA-RB)  0.011  0.003  0.195
Market valuation first
Fundamentals  (RA-RC)  0.113  0.295  0.681
Market valuation (RC)  0.035  0.012  0.061
Total sum of squares  1687.33  128.81  0.10
NT  8421  562  17
Note: These results are based  on using cash flows as a proxy for fundamentals  after splitting  the
Q ratio (eq. 3).
Entries in rows 3, 4, and 5 are ratios of sums of squares in individual  regressions  in relation to
the total sum of squares for the full model (shown in row 6).
(1) is based on pooled  regressions  with fixed firm and year effects. (2) is based  on cross-section
regressions  (Observation  for each firm are averaged  over the years).  (3) is based  on time-series
regressions (Observations  for each year are averaged across firms).
40Table 5: Analysis of sources of variation  in investment
Source of variation  Share of total sum of squares
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fundamentals  and marketl
valuation (RA)  0.092  0.336  0.680
Error (1-RA)  0.908  0.664  0.320
Fundamentals  first
Fundamentals  (RB)  0.089  0.290  0.651
Market valuation  (RA-RB)  0.003  0.046  0.029
Market valuation first
Fundamentals  (RA-RC)  0.069  0.310  0.561
Market valuation (RC)  0.023  0.026  0.119
Total sum of squares  27.97  1.24  0.001
NT  10852  602  17
Note: These results are based on using separate  proxies for fundamentals  and market valuation
(eq. 4).  (1) is based on the cash flow-Q model.  (2) and (3) are based on the cash flow-share
price model.
Entries in rows 3, 4, and 5 are ratios of sums of squares in individual  regressions  in relation to
the total sum of squares for the full model (shown in row 6).
(1) is based on pooled  regressions  with fixed firm and year effects. (2) is based on cross-section
regressions  (Observation  for each firm are averaged  over the years). (3) is based on time-series
regressions (Observations  for each year are averaged across firms).
41Table 6: Aggregate time-series:  1973-1990
Lag 2  Lag I  Lag 0
Market perception  0.001(0.07)  0.001(0.07)  -0.150(-22.02)
Managerial  0.001(0.03)  0.001(0.03)  0.859(36.56)
perception
D-W  statistic  AR parameter  Adjusted  r2
1.997  -0.998(-1570.4)  0.365
Lag 2  Lag  I  Lag 0
Market perception  *  0.005(0.07)  -0.150(-22.02)
Managerial  **  0.01(0.03)  0.859(36.56)
perception
D-W statistic  AR parameter  Adjusted  r2
1.997  -0.998(-1571.2)  0.365
l  ____________  Lag 2  Lag  1  Lag 0
Market perception  -0.150(-22.04)
Managerial  **  **  0.858(36.53)
perception
D-W statistic  AR parameter  Adjusted  r2
l_________________  1.998  -0.998(-1800.2)  0.365
Note: Sales performed as the best the proxy for fundamentals (eq.  3).  The parameters in the
table are after correction for first-order auto correlation  (AR). Intercept term not reported.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
42Table 7: Aggregate time-series:  1973-1990
Lag 2  Lag 1  Lag °
Market perception  0.002  0.002  -0.626
(a)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (-27.34)
Managerial  0.001  0.001  0.060
perception  (b)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (37.78)
D-W statistic  AR parameter  Adjusted r 2
1.976  -0.999  0.274
(-1718.5)
Lag 2  Lag  I  Lag 0
Market perception  **  0.813  -1.245
(a)  (1.62)  (-2.48)
Managerial  0.015  -0.033
perception (b)  (6.01)  (-0.92)
D-W statistic  AR parameter  Adjusted  r2
1.976  0.0998  0.274
(-1719.5)
Lag 2  Lag I  Lag 0
Market perception  **  *8  -0.627
(a)  (-27.35)
Managerial  **  **  0.060
perception (b)  (37.70)
D-W statistic  AR parameter  Adjusted  r2
1.978  -0.999  0.274
l  __________________  (-2224.3)
Note: (a) stock prices,  and (b) sales performed  as the best proxies (eq.  4). The parameters  in
the table are after correction for first-order auto correlation (AR). Intercept term not reported.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
43Table 9: Market perception  Vs Managerial  perception:  1973-1990
Market  Market  Managerial  Managerial  Adjusted
l_________  perception(t)  perception(t-l)  perception(t)  perception(t-1)  r2
1973(a)  0.005  -0.003*  0.103  0.244  0.175
_________  (2.87)  (-3.43)  (1.69)  (4.44)
1974(b)  -0.074*  0.031*  0.124  0.245  0.243
(-5.80)  (5.39)  (3.29)  (4.84)
1975(a)  0.006  0.002*  -0.010  0.217  0.217
(1.91)  (0.59)  (-0.34)  (7.20)
1976(b)  -0.056  0.093*  -0.017  00207  0.181
(-5.35)  (7.30)  (-0.34)  (3.92)
1977(a)  -0.007  0.017*  0.038  0.161  0.198
(-2.03)  (3.88)  (0.85)  (3.37)
1978(b)  -0.036*  0.044*  0.078  0.228  0.224
(-2.76)  (3.15)  (1.59)  (5.25)
1979(b)  -0.049  0.039*  0.025  0.310  0.188
(-3.64)  (3.37)  (0.52)  (5.83)
1980(a)  0.012  -0.002*  -0.012  0.211  0.166
(2.99)  (-1.45)  (-0.20)  (4.21)
1981(a)  -0.019  0.025*  0.019  0.218  0.218
(-3.30)  (5.15)  (0.43)  (3.78)
1982(a)  -0.0001*  0.010  0.134  0.054  0.165
(-0.03)  (1.58)  (3.16)  (1.53)
1983(b)  -0.061*  0.068  0.147  0.123  0.225
l________  (-5.44)  (4.93)  (4.72)  (3.92)
1984(b)  -0.039  0.007*  0.011  0.338  0.244
(-1.89)  (0.49)  (0.27)  (7.74)
1985(b)  -0.067*  0.052*  0.088  0.235  0.255
(-3.97)  (3.00)  (3.10)  (7.52)
1986(a)  -0.014  0.024*  0.025  0.151  0.192
(-2.55)  (3.83)  (0.63)  (4.26)
1987(a)  -0.010  0.016*  0.010  0.175  0.160
(-2.02)  (3.17)  (0.26)  (5.11)
441988(b)  -0.073*  0.063*  0.054  0.212  0.205
(-2.58)  (1.81)  (1.96)  (6.94)
1989(b)  -0.083*  0.052*  0.116  0.156  0.244
(-3.30)  (2.03)  (4.50)  (6.55)
1990(b)  -0.053  -0.0001  *  -0.049  0.828  0.251
(-2.25)  (-0.01)  (-1.82)  (9.83)
Notes: (a) Q-cash flow, and (b) share price-cash  flow performed the best. Intercept term not
reported (eq. 4).
* indicates that the  market perception term is  significantly different from the managerial
perception  terms for the same time period.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
45Table 8: Market perception Vs Managerial perception: 1973-1990
Market  Market  Managerial  Managerial  Adjusted
perception(t)  perception(t-1)  perception(t)  perception(t-1)  r 2
1973(a)  -0.036*  0.325*  -0.055  0.637  0.192
(-0.46)  (4.22)  (-4.13)  (5.29)  _
1974(b)  0.017  0.311*  0.138  -0.018  0.166
(0.16)  (3.79)  (0.83)  (-0.72)
1975(a)  0.288  -0.185*  0.144  0.405  0.179
(2.68)  (-1.93)  (1.40)  (3.59)
1976(a)  0.148  -0.159*  0.133  0.310  0.128
(1.28)  (-1.65)  (1.25)  (2.99)  .-
1977(a)  0.213  -0.117*  0.290  0.197  0.168
(1.98)  (-1.21)  (2.86)  (1.94)
1978(a)  0.266  -0.155*  0.347  0.217  0.215
(2.27)  (-1.30)  (2.80)  (1.82)
1979(a)  -0.157  0.155*  -0.083  0.565  0.144
(-1.26)  (1.22)  (0.67)  (4.52)
1980(a)  0.063  0.086*  0.060  0.539  0.198
l_______  (0.59)  (0.70)  (0.50)  (4.15)
1981(a)  -0.200  0.255*  -0.243  0.795  0.198
(-1.70)  (2.37)  (-2.07)  (6.51)
1982(a)  -0.314*  0.315  0.239  0.216  0.152
(-2.67)  (2.59)  (1.94)  (1.62)
1983(a)  -0.077*  0.018*  0.225  0.304  0.191
(-0.63)  (0.15)  (194)  (2.56)
1984(a)  -0.162*  -0.035*  0.072  0.524  0.270
(-1.16)  (-0.28)  (0.53)  (3.92)
1985(a)  -0.140*  -0.109*  0.177  0.509  0.261
(-0.84)  (-0.69)  (1.21)  (3.34)
1986(a)  -0.037  -0.023*  0.141  0.492  0.195
(-0.21)  (-0.13)  (0.74)  (2.63)
1987(a)  0.181  -0.204*  0.136  0.491  0.280
(1.45)  (-1.60)  (1.08)  (4.01)
461988(a)  -0.061*  -0.102*  0.244  0.352  0.266
l________  (-0.51)  (-0.85)  (1.83)  (2.74)
1989(a)  -0.059  -0.076*  0.020  0.575  0.268
(-0.47)  (-0.57)  (0.15)  (4.29)
1990(a)  0.058  -0.026*  0.046  0.440  0.197
l________  (0.49)  (-0.20)  (0.37)  (3.46)
Notes: (a) cash flows, and (b) sales are used as proxies for fundamentals. Based on OLS
regressions  that split the Q ratio into components  of market valuation  and fundamentals  (eq. 3).
Intercept term not reported.
* indicates that the market perception  term is statistically  different from the market perception
term for the same time period.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
47Table 10: Share issues and firm characteristics
(Net share issues/Total assets)
NT  3744
Q  0.001(7.11)
Financial slack  -0.129(-7.88)
Net issue of long-term debt  -0.164(-13.59)
Return on assets  0.045(3.46)
Changes in S&P 500  0.0002(0.31)
GDP growth  -0.002(-0.37)
Adjusted  9  0.076
Note: The regressions  include fixed firm and year effects.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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